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Abstract
When attacking a distributed protocol, an adaptive adversary is able to determine its actions
(e.g., which parties to corrupt) at any time based on its entire view of the protocol including
the entire communication history. Proving security of cryptographic protocols against adaptive
adversaries is a fundamental problem in cryptography. In this paper, we consider distributed
public-key systems which are secure against an adaptive adversary. Speci4cally, we construct
distributed discrete-log-based and RSA-based public-key systems secure against an adaptive ad-
versary. We also extend the discrete-log-based systems to have proactive security, that is, security
against an (adaptive) mobile adversary that has an upper bound on the number of servers it may
corrupt at any one time, but no upper bound on the number of servers it may corrupt over the
lifetime of the system. c© 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Distributed public-key systems involve public=secret key pairs where the secret key
is distributively held by some number of servers (using a secret sharing scheme), and
a quorum of servers is needed to act on a common input in order to produce a function
value (a signature or a cleartext). As long as an adversary does not corrupt a certain
threshold of servers the system remains secure (as opposed to centralized cryptosys-
tems in which the compromise of a single entity breaks the system). Function sharing
(Threshold) systems were presented in [12–14]. Robust function sharing systems, in
which the function can be evaluated correctly even if the adversary causes the servers
it controls to misbehave arbitrarily, were presented in [28, 22, 27]. Proactively secure
systems, which maintain security and robustness against mobile adversaries [37] that
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may corrupt diBerent sets of servers over time (possibly all servers at one time or
another), were presented in [32, 21, 8, 20, 39]. Constructions of these systems are re-
quired to be eCcient (e.g., they should not involve generic secure function evaluation
which is assumed impractical [12]). The current trend for speci4c eCcient solutions is
reviewed in [30, 26].
All the previous protocols for distributed cryptosystems have been proven secure
against a static adversary, i.e., an adversary that decides its actions (and speci4cally,
its corruption strategy) before the execution of the protocol. We say a protocol is
adaptively secure if it is secure against an adaptive adversary. Adaptive security is a
fundamental problem in cryptography, and has been recently considered in the context
of multi-party computations (secure function evaluation), initially where parties erase
some of their information [4], and later even when they do not necessarily do so [5].
An adaptively secure oblivious transfer protocol was given in [3].
In this paper, we examine the problem of obtaining adaptively secure distributed
public-key systems. Adaptive security for distributed public-key systems has also been
considered recently in Canetti et al. [6], which is extended by Jarecki and Lysyanskaya
[35], where non-optimally resilient protocols for discrete-log based key generation and
threshold function application are proven secure against adaptive adversaries. They
sketch how to construct corresponding optimally resilient protocols, and also how to
construct a speci4c l-out-of-l RSA system). The work in this paper was developed
independently from the work of Canetti et al. [6], and deals with both discrete-log-
based (DL-based) [15] and RSA-based [40] systems. In a companion paper [25], this
work is extended to proactive maintenance of RSA-based systems based on polynomial
sharing.
The major diCculty in proving the security of protocols against adaptive adversaries
is being able to eCciently and consistently simulate the view of an adversary which
may corrupt parties dynamically, depending on some internal, and possibly bizarre,
strategy. In particular, when a party is corrupted, its (simulated) internal state must
be consistent with the current view of the adversary. However, the simulator does not
know the true secret keys, and is not able to determine the true internal states of all
parties simultaneously. In fact, in most protocols the simulator is not able to determine
the true internal states of more than half of the parties in the system. Therefore, the
simulator may have diCculty producing a consistent internal state for an arbitrary set of
parties that is corrupted. (Recall that the number of possible sets is exponential in the
total number of parties.) The technique of backtracking (often used in zero-knowledge
proofs) is problematic since after backtracking the view of the adversary will most
likely change, and the adversary may then corrupt a diBerent set of parties based on
its internal strategy.
Remark In real systems, there is no reason why an adversary could not corrupt
parties dynamically according to any strategy it chooses, and thus adaptive security is
a very natural and important concept.
In distributed public-key systems, the problem of adaptive security is exacerbated by
the fact that there is generally public function and related publicly committed robustness
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information available to anyone, which as discussed above, needs to be consistent with
internal states of parties which get corrupted. This is the main cause of diCculties in
the proof of security.
Our contributions and techniques. We give a new set of techniques that can be used
to construct distributed DL-based and RSA-based public-key systems with adaptive
security. Since the simulation-based proofs of the earlier techniques fail against an
adaptive adversary, we have to employ new ideas. The driving “meta idea” is to develop
techniques that assure, in spite of the exponential set of behaviors of the adversary,
that the adversary can only disrupt the simulation with polynomial probability. This
argument will assure simulatability and thus a proof of security. The basic principle
is based on the notion of a faking server. The simulator exploits the actions of this
server to assure that the view is simulatable while not knowing the secret key. This
server is chosen at random and its public actions are indistinguishable from an honest
server to the adversary. We have to backtrack the simulation only if the adversary
corrupts this special server. Since there is only one faking server, and since regardless
of its corruption strategy, the adversary has a polynomial chance (at least 1=(t+1)) of
not corrupting this one server, we will be able to complete the simulation in expected
polynomial time.
We employ non-binding encryption and develop the notion of detached commit-
ments, that is, commitments that can be used to ensure correct behavior of servers
(i.e., robustness), yet have no hard attachment to the secret key, thus allowing an
eCcient simulation. First we show how to work with these detached commitments,
e.g., using function representation transformations like poly-to-sum and sum-to-poly
(which we build based on Frankel et al. [20]). Next we show how to maintain
robustness by constructing simulatable soft attachments from these detached com-
mitments to the secret-key-based function applications. The soft attachments are con-
structed using eCcient zero-knowledge proofs-of-knowledge. 1 The protocols we give
for these zero-knowledge proofs-of-knowledge are similar to Cramer et al. [11], but
are novel in the following ways: (1) there is one setup protocol for all the proof
protocols, which allows concurrency in the proof protocols, and (2) the setup and
proof protocols are not as tightly related (i.e. the setup does not prove knowledge of
a commitment based on exactly what the proof protocol is trying to prove) but still
achieve statistical zero-knowledge (no reliance on computational assumptions). We be-
lieve these ZK-proof techniques will be useful in developing future threshold crypto-
systems.
We note that the detached commitment methodology is crucial against an adaptive
adversary. It allows the security by simulation to deal with simulation of a message
signing (or decryption) without rewinding the simulation beyond the current signing
(decryption). It enables to translate an adaptive adversary who chooses messages and
1 These are actually computationally sound proofs, or arguments, but we will simply use the term proof.
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corruption of servers to an adversary against the centralized system with the same
choice of messages. 2
Our techniques maintain “optimal resilience”, namely, the protocols can withstand
any minority of misbehaving servers (t faults out of l servers while l¿2t + 1 is
allowed). Our main results are:
Theorem 1. There exists an adaptively secure proactive DL-based optimal-resilient
(t; l)-threshold public-key system.
Theorem 2. There exists an adaptively secure robust RSA-based optimal-resilient
(t; l)-threshold public-key system.
In a companion paper [25], we extend this work to proactive-maintenance of RSA-
based systems, which requires additional techniques.
2. Model and denitions
Our system consists of l servers S= {S1; : : : ; Sl}. A server is corrupted if it is
controlled by the adversary. When a server is corrupted, we assume without loss of
generality that the adversary sees all the information currently on that server. On the
other hand, the system should not open secrets of unavailable servers. Namely, we
separate availability faults from security faults (and do not cause security exposures
due to unavailability). We assume that all un-corrupted servers receive all messages
that are broadcast, and may retrieve the information from messages encrypted with a
public key, if they know the corresponding private key. Our communication model
is similar to Herzberg et al. [33]. All participants communicate via an authenticated
bulletin board [9] in a synchronized manner.
The adversary. Our threshold schemes assume a stationary adversary which stays
at corrupt servers, i.e. once a server is corrupted, it stays corrupted. Our proactive
schemes assumes a mobile adversary as de4ned in [37, 32]. That is, time is divided
into alternating operational periods (where function evaluation takes place) and update
periods (where refreshing of key shares takes place), and an adversary may corrupt
diBerent servers in diBerent time periods, with servers possibly being refreshed or
rebooted (i.e. they become uncorrupted) during update periods.
In all schemes we assume the adversary is t-restricted; namely it can, during the
lifetime of the system (or during any period, for proactive systems), corrupt at most t
servers. The actions of an adversary at any time may include submitting messages to
2 The related work in Canetti et al. [6] does not use this methodology. From their sketch of the threshold
t-out-of-l RSA system, it seems that the following is needed in their system: to be able to simulate they
need an l-out-of-l update of keys after each signature. This is not a threshold scheme due to availability
requirements (which needs all servers to be available for each signature). Also, it seems that it may be hard
to prove security of history-dependent signature schemes in such a case.
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the system to be signed, corrupting servers, and broadcasting arbitrary information on
the communication channel. The adversary is adaptive; namely it is allowed to base
its actions not only on previous function outputs, but on all the information that it has
previously obtained during the execution of the protocol.
Remark When proving security the adversary is translated into an adaptive adversary
which makes the same adaptive message challenges against the centralized system
(where the key is held by a centralized server and no protocol is performed to answer
the challenge).
2.1. DL-based and RSA-based systems
Next we give information on the basics of DL-based and RSA-based systems. It
includes, among other information, details of the variants of secret sharing schemes
that are used, such as Shamir threshold secret sharing and Pedersen uncondition-
ally secure threshold veri4able secret sharing ((t; l)-US-VSS) over known groups,
along with secret sharing and unconditionally secure threshold veri4able secret sharing
(INT-(t; l)-US-VSS) over the integers, with check shares computed modulo an RSA
modulus.
2.1.1. Basics for DL-based systems
In these systems, we assume that p and q are two primes such that p=mq+ 1 (in
many cases m=2 is used), and that g is an elements of Z∗p of order q; so g
q≡ 1modp.
Various signature schemes have been developed based on the intractability of comput-
ing discrete logs, which formally is stated as follows:
DLP Assumption. Let k be the security parameter. The DLP assumption is as follows.
Given primes p and q as above with |p|= k; and given an element g∈Z∗p of order
q; and the group Gg generated by g in Z∗p ; for any polynomial-time algorithm A;
Pr[gx ≡ymodp :y∈R Gg; x←A(1k ; p; q; g; y)] is negligible.
We use various sharing techniques. We assume the reader is familiar with Shamir
(t; l)-threshold polynomial secret sharing [42]. We will use the polynomial interpolation
formula explicitly, so we will describe it here. For a t-degree polynomial v(x); and a
set = {i1; : : : ; it+1} of size t+1; v(0) can be computed using polynomial interpolation.
De4ne zi;=
∏
j∈\{i}(i − j)−1(0− j). Then v(0)=
∑
i∈ v(i)zi;.
We now describe an unconditionally secure (t; l)-VSS ((t; l)-US-VSS) due to Peder-
sen [38] where secrets are drawn from Zq and veri4cation shares are computed in Zp.
We assume an h in Gg is generated in some way so that the discrete log of h relative
to g is unknown (this can be assured via proper initialization).
The protocol begins with two (t; l)-threshold polynomial secret sharings, sharing se-
crets s; s′ ∈Zq. Let a(x)=
∑t
j=0 ajx
j be the random polynomial used in sharing s and
let a′(x)=
∑t
j=0 a
′
jx
j be the random polynomial used in sharing s′. For all i; Si re-
ceives shares si = a(i) and s′i = a
′(i). (We refer to the pair (a(i); a′(i)) as dual-share i.)
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Also, the veri=cation shares {j(= gajha′j )}06j6t ; are published. 3 Say check share
Ai =
∏t
j=0 
i j
j . Si can verify the correctness of his shares by checking that Ai = g
sihs
′
i .
Say s and s′ are the shares computed using Lagrange interpolation from a set of t +1
shares that passed the veri4cation step. If the dealer can reveal diBerent secrets sˆ and
sˆ′ that also correspond to the zero coeCcient veri4cation share, then the dealer can
compute a discrete log of h relative to g.
2.1.2. Basics for RSA-based systems
RSA-based systems rely on the intractability of computing RSA inverses, and hence,
the intractability of factoring products of two large primes. Let k be the security param-
eter. Let key generator GE de4ne a family of RSA functions to be (e; d; N )←GE(1k)
such that N is a composite number N =P∗Q where P;Q are prime numbers of k=2 bits
each. The exponent e and modulus N are made public while d≡ e−1 mod !(N ) is kept
private. 4 The RSA encryption function is public, de4ned for each message M ∈ZN as:
C =C(M)≡MemodN . The RSA decryption function (also called signature function)
is the inverse: M =CdmodN . It can be performed by the owner of the private key d.
Formally, the RSA Assumption is stated as follows:
RSA Assumption. Let k be the security parameter. Let key generator GE de4ne a fam-
ily of RSA functions (i.e., (e; d; N )←GE(1k) is an RSA instance with security
parameter k). For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A; Pr[ue≡wmod
N : (e; d; N )←GE(1k);w∈R {0; 1}k ; u←A(1k ; w; e; N )] is negligible.
Next we describe variants of Shamir secret sharing and Pedersen VSS that we use
in RSA-based systems. They diBer in that operations on the shares are performed over
the integers, instead of in a modular subgroup of integers.
(t; l)-secret sharing over the integers (INT-(t; l)-SS) [20]. This is a variant of
Shamir secret sharing [42]. Let L= l! and let m be a positive integer. For sharing
a secret s∈ [0; mK] (and K the size of an interval over the integers), a random polyno-
mial a(x)=
∑t
j=0 ajx
j is chosen such that a0 =L2s; and each other aj ∈R {0; L; 2L; : : : ;
mL3K2}. 5 Each shareholder i∈{1; : : : ; l} receives a secret share si = a(i); and veri-
4es 6 that (1) 06si6mL3K2lt+1; and (2) L divides si. Any set  of cardinality t + 1
can compute s using Lagrange interpolation.
Unconditionally-secure (t; l)-VSS over the integers (INT-(t; l)-US-VSS). This is a
variant of Pedersen unconditionally-secure (t; l)-VSS [38], and is slightly diBerent than
3 In DL-based systems, we implicitly assume all veri4cation operations are performed in Z∗p .
4 !(N )= lcm(P − 1; Q − 1) is the smallest integer such that any element in Z∗N raised by !(N ) is the
identity element. RSA is typically de4ned using ((N ); the number of elements in Z∗N ; but it is easy to see
that !(N ) can be used instead. We use it because it gives an explicit way to describe an element of maximal
order in Z∗N . Note that ((N ) is a multiple of !(N ); and that knowing any value which is a multiple of !(N )
implies breaking the system.
5 We note that in our RSA-based systems, L2s is actually the secret component of the RSA secret key,
which when added to a public leftover component (in [0; L2 − 1]), forms the RSA secret key.
6 These tests only verify the shares are of the correct form, not that they are correct polynomial shares.
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the version in [24]. Let N be an RSA modulus and let g and h be generators whose
discrete log modulo N with respect to each other is unknown. The protocol begins
with two (t; l)-secret sharings over the integers, the 4rst sharing secret s with m=1;
and the second sharing s′ with m=NK . Note that s∈ [0; K] and s′ ∈ [0; NK2]. Let
a(x)=
∑t
j=0 ajx
j be the random polynomial used in sharing s and let a′(x)=
∑t
j=0 a
′
jx
j
be the random polynomial used in sharing s′. For all i; Si receives shares si = a(i) and
s′i = a
′(i). (We refer to the pair (a(i); a′(i)) as dual-share i.) Also, the veri=cation
shares {j(= gajha′j )}06j6t ; are published. 7 Say check share Ai =
∏t
j=0 
i j
j . Si can
verify the correctness of his shares by checking that Ai = gsihs
′
i . Say s and s′ are the
shares computed using Lagrange interpolation from a set of t + 1 shares that passed
the veri4cation step. If the dealer can reveal diBerent secrets sˆ and sˆ′ that also corre-
spond to the zero coeCcient veri4cation share, then the dealer can compute an  and
) such that g≡ h); which implies factoring, and thus breaking the RSA assumption
(see Lemma 3).
Looking ahead, we will need to simulate an INT-(t; l)-US-VSS. Using Lemma 2,
we can do this by constructing a random polynomial over an appropriate simulated
secret (e.g., a random secret, or a secret obtained as a result of a previously simulated
protocol) in the zero coeCcient, and a random companion polynomial with a totally
random zero coeCcient. Note that the ) value in the lemma will correspond to K; and
the * value in the lemma will correspond to the discrete log of g with respect to h;
which is less than N . The probability of distinguishing a real VSS from the simulated
VSS will be (4t + 2)=K; which is exponentially small if the range of secrets K is
exponentially large.
2.2. Distributed public-key systems
We will say that the secret key x is shared among the servers, and each server
Si holds share xi. The public key associated with x will be called y. The operations
performed could include cryptographic function application, or proactive updating of
the shares. We call these operations DISTAPPLY, and DISTUPDATE, respectively. We also
consider operation VERIFY, which veri4es the output of DISTAPPLY. 8 We say a (t; l)-
threshold system is a threshold system with l servers that is designed to withstand a
t-restricted adaptive adversary. We similarly may have (t; l)-proactive systems.
Next we give formal de4nitions for distributed public-key systems.
Denition 1 (Robustness of a threshold system). A (t; l)-threshold public-key system
S is robust if for any polynomial-time t-restricted adaptive stationary adversary A; with
7 In RSA-based systems, we implicitly assume all veri4cation operations are performed in Z∗N .
8 For encryption schemes like RSA, the DISTAPPLY operation is RSA decryption, and the VERIFY oper-
ation is simply RSA-encryption of the output of DISTAPPLY and veri4cation that it equals the input. For
encryption schemes like El-Gamal, the VERIFY operation may not be polynomial time. Note that the security
and robustness de4nitions still make sense in both of these cases.
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all but negligible probability, for each input m which is submitted to the DISTAPPLY
protocol the resulting output s passes VERIFY(y;m; s).
Denition 2 (Security of a threshold system). A (t; l)-threshold public-key system S
is secure if for any polynomial-time t-restricted adaptive stationary adversary A; after
polynomially-many DISTAPPLY protocols performed on given values, given a new value
m and the view of A; the probability of being able to produce an output s that passes
VERIFY(y;m; s) is negligible.
Denition 3 (Robustness of a proactive system). A (t; l)-proactive public-key system
S is robust if for any polynomial-time t-restricted adaptive mobile adversary A; with
all but negligible probability, after polynomially-many DISTUPDATE protocols for each
input m which is submitted to the DISTAPPLY protocol during an operational period, the
resulting output s passes VERIFY(y;m; s).
Denition 4 (Security of a proactive system). A (t; l)-proactive public-key system S
is secure if for any polynomial-time t-restricted adaptive mobile adversary A; af-
ter polynomially-many DISTAPPLY protocols performed during operational periods on
given values, and polynomially-many DISTUPDATE protocols, given a new value m and
the view of A; the probability of being able to produce an output s that passes
VERIFY(y;m; s) is negligible.
Remark. The way m and the prior inputs are chosen in De4nitions 2 and 4 corresponds
to the type of adversary that would be considered in the corresponding non-distributed
scheme. For instance, for a signature scheme that is secure against existential forgery
under adaptive chosen message attack, the value m and the prior inputs may be chosen
by the adversary in the distributed scheme. On the other hand, for a decryption scheme
like (standard) RSA, we assume in the distributed decryption scheme that the prior
inputs are chosen randomly, and the ciphertext m to be decrypted is given as input
to the adversary. In this paper we do not deal with stronger notions of choice of
decryption challenges (see [43, 7]).
3. Techniques
The main problem with proving security and robustness against adaptive adversaries
is that public values such as ciphertexts and commitments are linked to actual cleartext
values in an undeniable fashion. To detach ciphertexts from their cleartext values, we
simply employ semantically secure non-committing encryption [4]. In fact, our security
proofs 4rst assume perfectly secret channels and then add the above (a step we omit
here), using by now standard arguments about replacement of secure channels with
encryption.
A more involved issue concerns the commitments. We know that the collection
of techniques needed to underly distributed public-key systems include: distributed
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representation methods (polynomial sharing, sum (additive) sharing), representation
transformers which move between diBerent ways to represent a function (poly-to-sum,
sum-to-poly) as well as a set of elementary distributed operations (add, multiply, in-
vert). For example, the poly-to-sum protocol is executed by t + 1 servers at a time,
and transforms (t+1)-out-of-l polynomial-based sharings to (t+1)-out-of-(t+1) addi-
tive sharings. We need to have such techniques (motivated by Frankel et al. [24, 20])
which are secure and robust against adaptive adversaries. In the coming subsections,
we represent the basic techniques to manipulate representation of shared function.
We will rely on new zero-knowledge proof techniques (see Appendix A), as well
as on shared representation of secrets as explained in Section 2.1.
The notation 2poly refers to a polynomial and its companion polynomial shared with
(t; l)-US-VSS (which is unconditionally secure VSS) (or INT-(t; l)-US-VSS (which is
the same but over the integers)).
The notation 2sum refers to two additive sharings, with check shares that contain
both additive shares of a server (similar to the check shares in (t; l)-US-VSS). In de-
scribing the DL-based protocols, unless otherwise noted we will assume multiplication
is performed mod p and addition (of exponents) is performed mod q. In describing
the RSA-based protocols, unless otherwise noted we will assume multiplication is per-
formed mod N and addition (of exponents) is performed over the integers (i.e., not
“mod” anything).
3.1. 2poly-to-2sum
The goal of 2poly-to-2sum is to transform t-degree polynomials a( ) and a′( ) used
in (t; l)-US-VSS into t + 1 additive shares for each secret a(0) and a′(0); with corre-
sponding check shares. The idea is to perform interpolation. 9 The DL-based scheme
shown in Fig. 1 does not actually require any communication, since all check shares
1. Initial con=guration: (t; l)-US-VSS (parameters: (p; q; g; h)) with t-degree
polynomials a( ) and a′( ), and a set  of t+1 server indices. For all i∈,
recall Si holds shares si and s′i with corresponding check share Ai = g
sihs
′
i .
2. Si computes additive shares bi = sizi; and b′i = s
′
i zi;.
3. Every server computes the check shares Bi = gbihb
′
i =Azi; i for all i∈. (Note
that there is no communication, since the additive shares can be computed
individually by each shareholder, and all check shares can be computed from
publicly available veri4cation shares.)
Fig. 1. 2poly-to-2sum: DL-based scheme.
9 As opposed to [20], in which poly-to-sum also performed a rerandomization of the additive shares, we
have separate protocols for (1) converting a polynomial sharing into an additive sharing and (2) rerandom-
izing an additive sharing, since sometimes we do not need to do a rerandomization of additive shares.
544 Y. Frankel et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 287 (2002) 535–561
1. Initial con=guration: INT-(t; l)-US-VSS (parameters: (N; g; h)) with t-degree
polynomials a( ) and a′( ), and a set  of t+1 server indices. For all i∈,
recall Si holds shares si and s′i with corresponding check share Ai = g
sihs
′
i .
2. For all i∈, Si computes the additive shares bi = sizi; and b′i = s′i zi; and
publishes Bi = gbihb
′
i =Azi; i .
3. All servers verify Bi for all i∈ using (Ai)Vi;  ≡ (Bi)V ′i;  where
Vi;=
∏
j∈\{i}(0 − j) and V ′i;=
∏
j∈\{i}(i − j). If the veri4cation for
a given Bi fails, each server broadcasts a (Bad,i) message and quits the
protocol.
Fig. 2. 2poly-to-2sum: RSA-based scheme.
1. Initial con=guration: (Parameters (p; q; g; h)) There is a set  of t+1 server
indices. For all i∈, Si holds additive dual-share (bi; b′i), with corresponding
check share Bi = gbihb
′
i .
2. For all i∈, Si chooses ri; j ∈R Zq and r′i; j ∈R Zq for j∈\{i}.
3. For all i∈, Si sets ri; i = bi −
∑
j∈\{i} ri; j and r
′
i; i = b
′
i −
∑
j∈\{i} r
′
i; j.
4. For all i∈, Si privately transmits ri; j and r′i; j to all Sj for j∈\{i}.
5. For all i∈, Si publishes Ri; j = gri; j hr′i; j for j∈\{i}.
6. All servers can compute Ri; i =Bi=
∏
j∈\{i} Ri; j for all i∈.
7. For all j∈, Sj veri4es Ri; j ≡ gri; j hr′i; j . If the veri4cation fails, Sj broadcasts
an (Accuse,i,Ri; j) message, to which Si responds by broadcasting ri; j and
r′i; j. If Si does not respond, or Ri; j 
≡ gri; j hr
′
i; j (which all servers can now test),
then each server broadcasts a (Bad,i) message and quits the protocol.
8. For all j∈, Sj computes dj =
∑
i∈ ri; j, d
′
j =
∑
i∈ r
′
i; j, and Dj =
∏
i∈ Ri; j.
Fig. 3. 2sum-to-2sum: DL-based scheme.
can be computed from public information. The RSA-based scheme shown in Fig. 2
is similar, but requires Si to broadcast the check share, since it cannot be computed
by every server. We note that in Step 2 each si and s′i is a multiple of L; so Si can
actually compute bi and b′i over the integers.
3.2. 2sum-to-2sum
The goal of 2sum-to-2sum is to randomize additive dual-shares (most likely
obtained from a 2poly-to-2sum) and update the corresponding check shares. The
DL-based scheme is in Fig. 3 and the RSA-based scheme in Fig. 4.
3.3. 2sum-to-1sum
The goal of 2sum-to-1sum is to reveal check shares corresponding to the 4rst half of
additive dual-shares, and prove they are correct. These proofs form the soft attachments
from the information-theoretically secure veri4cation shares to the computationally
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1. Initial con=guration: (Parameters: (N; g; h)) There is a set  of t+1 server
indices. For all i∈, Si holds additive dual-share (bi; b′i), with corresponding
check share Bi = gbihb
′
i .
2. For all i∈, Si chooses ri; j ∈R ZN and r′i; j ∈R ZN , for j∈\{i}.
3. For all i∈, Si sets ri; i = bi −
∑
j∈\{i} ri; j and r
′
i; i = b
′
i −
∑
j∈\{i} r
′
i; j.
4. For all i∈, Si privately transmits ri; j and r′i; j to all Sj for j∈\{i}.
5. For all i∈, Si publishes Ri; j = gri; j hr′i; j for j∈\{i}.
6. All servers can compute Ri; i =Bi=
∏
j∈\{i} Ri; j for all i∈.
7. For all j∈, Sj veri4es that each ri; j and r′i; j received is in the cor-
rect range and that Ri; j ≡ gri; j hr′i; j . If the veri4cation fails, Sj broadcasts an
(Accuse,i,Ri; j) message, to which Si responds by broadcasting ri; j and r′i; j.
If Si does not respond, ri; j or r′i; j is not in the correct range, or Ri; j 
≡ gri; j hr
′
i; j
(which all servers can now test), then each server broadcasts a (Bad,i) mes-
sage and quits the protocol.
8. For all j∈, Sj computes dj =
∑
i∈ ri; j, d
′
j =
∑
i∈ r
′
i; j, andDj =
∏
i∈ Ri; j.
Fig. 4. 2sum-to-2sum: RSA-based scheme.
1. Initial con=guration: Parameters (p; q; g; h). There is a set  of t+1 server
indices. For all i∈, Si holds additive dual-share (di; d′i), with correspond-
ing check share Di = gdihd
′
i . Also, all servers Si with i∈ have performed
a ZK-proof-setup protocol ZKSETUP-DL(p; q; g; h) with all other servers.
2. For all i∈, Si broadcasts Ei = gdi .
3. For all i∈, Si performs a ZK-proof of knowledge ZKPROOF-DL-REP
(p; q; g; h; Ei; h; Di) with all other servers. Recall that this is performed over
a broadcast channel so all servers can check if the ZK-proof was performed
correctly.
4. If a server detects that for some i∈, Si fails to perform the ZK-proof
correctly, that server broadcasts a message (Bad,i) and quits the protocol
Fig. 5. 2sum-to-1sum: DL-based scheme.
secure check shares that must correspond to the actual secret. The DL-based scheme
is shown in Fig. 5 and the RSA-based scheme is shown in Fig. 6.
3.4. 2sum-to-2poly
The protocol is given in Fig. 7.
4. Protocols
To begin, we present protocols for DISTAPPLY (threshold cryptographic function appli-
cation), and DISTUPDATE (proactive maintenance of key shares), for both DL-based and
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1. Initial con=guration: Parameters (N; e; g; h). There is a set  of t+1 server
indices. For all i∈, Si holds additive dual-share (di; d′i), with correspond-
ing check share Di = gdihd
′
i . Also, all servers Si with i∈ have performed
a ZK-proof-setup protocol ZKSETUP-RSA(N; e; g) with all other servers.
2. For all i∈, Si broadcasts Ei = mdi , where m is the message to be signed,
or more generally, the value to which the cryptographic function is being
applied.
3. For all i∈, Si performs a ZK-proof of knowledge ZKPROOF-IF-REP
(N; e; g; m; Ei; h; Di) with all other servers. Recall that this is performed over
a broadcast channel so all servers can check if the ZK-proof was performed
correctly.
4. If a server detects that for some i∈, Si fails to perform the ZK-proof
correctly, that server broadcasts a message (Bad,i) and quits the protocol.
Fig. 6. 2sum-to-1sum: RSA-based scheme.
1. Initial con=guration: Parameters (p; q; g; h). There is a set  of server in-
dices. For all i∈, Si holds additive dual-share (di; d′i), with corresponding
check share Di = gdihd
′
i .
2. For each i∈, Si shares di and d′i using (t; l)-US-VSS, say with polynomials
vi( ) and v′i( ).
3. Sj computes the sums v(j)=
∑
i∈ vi(j) and v
′(j)=
∑
i∈ v
′
i(j). The ver-
i4cation shares for v( ) and v′( ) can be computed from the veri4cation
shares for vi( ) and v′i( ), for i∈.
4. If a veri4cation fails for the (t; l)-US-VSS from Si, each server broadcasts
(Bad; i). When 2sum-to-2poly is used for proactive maintenance, the servers
quit the protocol.
Fig. 7. 2sum-to-2poly: DL-based scheme.
RSA-based systems. We then present the complete proactive threshold cryptosystems
for both DL-based and RSA-based systems (assuming the keys are already distributed).
The security and robustness of these protocols are proven in Section 5.3.
4.1. DL-based threshold function application
Here we consider any DL-based (t; l)-threshold function application protocol that
works by (1) constructing a veri4able additive representation of the secret x over t+1
servers with check shares over g; (2) 4nishing the function application with those t+1
servers (we will call this the additive application step), if there is no misbehavior, and
(3) going back to step (1) if misbehavior is detected, discarding servers which have
misbehaved and using t + 1 remaining servers. We assume that there is a simulator
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1. Initial con=guration: (t; l)-US-VSS (parameters: (p; q; g; h)) with t-degree
polynomials a( ) and a′( ). Also, each server maintains a list G of server
indices for servers that have not misbehaved (i.e., they are considered good).
A message m needs to be signed.
2. A set ⊆G with ||= t + 1 is chosen in some public way.
3. 2poly-to-2sum is run. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are
removed from G and the protocol loops to Step 2.
4. 2sum-to-2sum is run. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are
removed from G and the protocol loops to Step 2.
5. 2sum-to-1sum is run. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are
removed from G and the protocol loops to Step 2.
6. The additive application step of the signature protocol is run. If there are
misbehaving servers, their indices are removed from G and the protocol
loops to Step 2.
7. All values created during the signing protocol for m are erased.
Fig. 8. DL-based function application protocol.
for the additive application step for a message m which can simulate the step with
inputs consisting of t + 1 additive shares with t + 1 check shares, where at most
one additive share does not correspond to its check share, and a signature on m. The
simulator fails only if the faking server (the one containing the unmatched share and
check share) is corrupted, and otherwise provides a view to the adversary which is
perfectly indistinguishable from the view the adversary would have in the real protocol.
Most robust threshold DL-based protocols against static adversaries, like AMV-Harn
[1, 31] and El-Gamal decryption [18] work this way. For an example with AMV-
Harn signatures, see [34]. We show how to use this technique for static adversaries
to construct a protocol that withstands an adaptive adversary. Speci4cally, we use a
(t; l)-US-VSS representation to store the secret, and for function application we use
2poly-to-1sum (shorthand for the concatenation of 2poly-to-2sum, 2sum-to-2sum, and
2sum-to-1sum) to construct the veri4able additive representation of the secret. We call
this the DL-based function application protocol. The protocol is given in Fig. 8.
4.2. RSA-based threshold function application
We de4ne RSA-based function application protocols analogously to DL-based func-
tion application protocols. The main change is that the version of VSS over the integers
(INT-(t; l)-US-VSS) should be used. (An example of this type of protocol for RSA
signature and decryption functions is given in Frankel et al. [20].) This allows the
simulator to construct a view for the adversary which is statistically indistinguish-
able (as opposed to perfectly indistinguishable in the DL-based protocols) from the
view the adversary would have in the real protocol. We also shortcut the additive
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1. The dealer generates an RSA public=private key (N; e; d), and computes
public value x∗ and secret value x such that d≡ x∗ + L2xmod((N ), as
in [21].a Then the dealer generates generators g; h∈R Z∗N , x′∈R ZN 3 , and an
INT-(t; l)-US-VSS (with K =N , i.e., the range of the secret is assumed to
be [0; N ]) on secrets x; x′ with parameters (N; g; h).
2. Each (ordered) pair of servers (Si; Sj) performs ZKSETUP-RSASi ; Sj (N; e; g; h).
3. Each server maintains a list G of server indices for servers that have not
misbehaved (i.e., they are considered good).
4. When a message m needs to be signed, the following DISTAPPLY protocol is
run:
(a) A set ⊆G with ||= t + 1 is chosen in some public way.
(b) 2poly-to-2sum is run. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are
removed from G and the protocol loops to Step 4a.
(c) 2sum-to-2sum is run. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are
removed from G and the protocol loops to Step 4a.
(d) 2sum-to-1sum is run. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices
are removed from G and the protocol loops to Step 4a. If there is
no misbehavior, the signature on m can be computed from the partial
signatures generated in this step.
(e) All values created during the signing protocol for m are erased.
a Recall that x∗ is computed using only the public values N; e; L.
Fig. 9. Basic RSA-based threshold protocol [21].
application step, and simply form the partial RSA signatures in the 2sum-to-1sum
step.
The protocol is given in Fig. 9. (Because we will not discuss proactive RSA systems,
we actually present here a complete description of a basic RSA-based threshold system
that includes the function application protocol.)
4.3. DL-based proactive maintenance
For DL-based proactive maintenance, we perform an update by running 2poly-to-
2sum on the secret polynomials, and then 2sum-to-2poly. After 2sum-to-2poly, each
server erases all previous share information, leaving just the new polynomial shares.
If there is misbehavior by a server in either protocol, the procedure is restarted with
new participants (here restarts do not introduce statistical biases and do not reduce the
protocol’s security). The protocol is given in Fig. 10. The complete proactive system
is outlined in Fig. 11.
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1. Initial con=guration: (t; l)-US-VSS (parameters: (p; q; g; h)) with t-degree
polynomials a( ) and a′( )
2. Each server broadcasts what it believes h to be, and the correct h is deter-
mined by a majority vote.
3. Each (ordered) pair of servers (Si; Sj) performs ZKSETUP-DLSi ; Sj (p; q; g; h).
4. Each server maintains a list G of server indices for servers that have not
misbehaved (i.e., they are considered good).
5. A set  ⊆ G with || = t + 1 is chosen in some public way.
6. 2poly-to-2sum is run. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are
removed from G and the protocol loops to Step 5.
7. 2sum-to-2poly is run. If there are misbehaving servers (among ), their
indices are removed from G and the protocol loops to Step 5.
8. All previous share information is erased.
Fig. 10. DL-based proactive maintenance (key update) protocol.
1. Initial con=guration: DL-based system parameters: (p; q; g).
2. The dealer generates h∈R Z∗p, x; x′∈R Zq, y = gx, and a (t; l)-US-VSS on
secrets x; x′.
3. Each (ordered) pair of servers (Si; Sj) performs ZKSETUP-DLSi ; Sj
(p; q; g; h).
4. Each server maintains a list G of server indices for servers that have not
misbehaved (i.e., they are considered good). It also maintains public pa-
rameters: (p; q; g; h; y; l; t) and the veri4cation shares of the (t; l)-US-VSS
polynomials a( ) and a′( ) which have a(0) = x and a′(0) = x′.
5. When a message m needs to be signed, the servers agree on the public
parameters, then the function application protocol is run.
6. When an update is scheduled to occur, the servers agree on the public
parameters, then the proactive maintenance protocol is run.
Fig. 11. DL-based proactive threshold protocol.
5. Proofs
We start this section by proving certain properties of the basic techniques we use,
and then we prove the main theorems stated in the introduction.
5.1. Proofs of techniques
The following lemma from Frankel et al. [20] is used to prove the subsequent lemma,
which in turn is used to prove the simulatability of INT-(t; l)-US-VSS.
Lemma 1. Let r(x)= r0 + r1x + · · · + rtxt be a random polynomial of degree t such
that r(0)= r0 =L2k (k ∈ [0; K]) and rj ∈R {0; L; : : : ; )L3K} for 16j6t. Let ′ be a
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set of t servers. Then with probability at least 1−2t=); for any kˆ ∈ [0; K]; there exists
a polynomial r′(x)= r′0+r
′
1x+ · · ·+r′t xt with r′(0)= r′0 =L2kˆ and r′j ∈{0; L; : : : ; )L3K}
for 16j6t such that r(i)= r′(i) for i∈′.
Lemma 2. Let *∈ [1; m]. Let r(x)= r0 + r1x + · · ·+ rtxt be a random polynomial of
degree t such that r(0)= r0 =L2k (k ∈ [0; K]) and rj ∈R {0; L; : : : ; )L3K} for 16j6t.
Let r′(x)= r′0 + r
′
1x + · · · + r′t xt be a random polynomial of degree t such that
r′(0)= r′0 =L
2k ′ (k ′ ∈ [0; mK)]) and rj ∈R {0; L; : : : ; )L3mK} for 16j6t. Let ′ be a
set of t servers. Then with probability at least 1− (4t+2)=); for any kˆ ∈ [0; K]; there
exists polynomials rˆ(x)= rˆ0 + rˆ1x + · · ·+ rˆtxt with rˆ(0)= rˆ0 =L2kˆ and rˆj ∈{0; L; : : : ;
)L3K} for 16j6t; and rˆ′(x)= rˆ′0 + rˆ′1x + · · · + rˆ′t xt with rˆ′(0)=L2(*k + k ′ − *kˆ);
06rˆ′(0)6)L2mK and rˆ′j ∈{0; L; : : : ; )L3mK} for 16j6t; such that r(i)= rˆ(i) and
r′(i)= rˆ′(i) for i∈′; and *r(x) + r′(x)= *rˆ(x) + rˆ′(x).
Proof. Except for the last equation, we get from Lemma 1 that the probability that
the polynomials rˆ(x) and rˆ′(x) (with coeCcients in the correct ranges) do not exist
is at most [2=)] + [2t=)] + [2t=)]; where the 4rst 2=) arises from the probability that
rˆ′(0) is in the correct range, given an additive oBset of L2(*k − *kˆ)∈ [−L2mK; L2mK]
from L2k ′. If those polynomials do exist, then the last equation follows since (1) the
degree of the polynomial on each side of the equivalence is t; (2) the polynomials
obviously agree at the t locations in ′; and (3) the polynomials agree at 0; since
*r(0) + r′(0)=L2*k + L2k ′=L2*kˆ + L2(*k + k ′ − *kˆ)= *rˆ(0) + rˆ′(0).
5.2. Useful RSA lemmas
Lemma 3 (Frankel et al. [24]). Let k be the security parameter. Let modulus genera-
tor GE de=ne a family of modulus generating functions (i.e.; N ←GE(1k) be an RSA
modulus with security parameter k). For any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
A; the following is negligible: Pr[ue≡wdmodN ; (e 
=0)∨ (d 
=0) :N ←GE(1k); u;
w∈R {0; 1}k ; e; d←A(1k ; w; u; N )]
Proof. Similar to Bach [2].
The following corollary follows from Lemma 3 and the RSA assumption (and hence
from the RSA assumption).
Corollary 1. Let k be the security parameter. Let GE be an RSA generator (that pro-
duces large public exponents); i.e.; (N; e)←GE(1k). For any probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm A;
Pr[(g≡ h)modN ; ( 
= 0) ∨ () 
= 0)) ∨ (g= ue) :
(N; e)← GE(1k); g; h∈R {0; 1}k ; (; ); u)← A(1k ; g; h; N )]
is negligible.
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5.3. Proofs of protocols
For clarity our proofs are written for distributed signature schemes. It should be easy
to see that with appropriate wording changes (“ciphertext” for “message”, etc.) that
they also apply to distributed decryption schemes.
Proof of Theorem 1. We prove the robustness and security of the basic DL-based
proactive threshold protocol. Robustness is based on the DLP Assumption, while secu-
rity is based on the security of the underlying signature scheme. Recall that we assume
the adversary is mobile and adaptive.
Robustness. Say P(k) is a polynomial bound on the number of messages m that the
protocol signs. Say an adversary prevents the signing of a message with non-negligible
probability 0. We will show how to solve the DLP with probability
0− tP(k) + 1
q
:
Say we are given an instance of the DLP, namely for a given set of parameters
(p; q; g), we are given a uniformly chosen value h∈Gq. We create a simulator that
runs the dealer as normal, except that h is taken from the DLP instance (when h
is generated in a distributed way, say as in Gennaro et al. [29] or Frankel et al.
[23], we would also be able to inject our DLP instance). Then the servers are run as
normal, except that the extractor for the ZKPROOF-DL-REP protocol is run whenever an
uncorrupted server is playing the veri4er and a corrupted server is playing the prover.
Note that since the simulator knows the secrets x; x′, the normal operation of the servers
can be simulated easily. We will show that if an adversary is able to prevent a message
from being signed, we can (except with negligible probability) determine DL(h; g).
If a server is not corrupted, the probability of a failed extraction using that server is
1=q. There will obviously be at least one uncorrupted server that runs the extractor with
every corrupted server, and thus the probability of any corrupted server not allowing a
successful extraction during the protocol is at most tP(k)=q. Say Si runs the extractor
successfully on Sj. If Si extracts a way to open the commitment Ci; j = g1i; j h1
′
i; j (from
the setup protocol), say with (2i; j ; 2′i; j), then except with probability 1=q, this will give
DL (h; g) =
2i;j − 1i;j
1′i;j − 2′i;j
:
Therefore, with probability at most
tP(k) + 1
q
;
there was either an extraction that failed or an extraction that succeeded, but produced
a way to open Ci; j with the same pair of values used to create it.
It should be clear that in any update period, after at most t + 1 attempts, there
will be a set  of t + 1 servers that participate in the update without any veri4cation
failures. Now say that the polynomial shares created during some operational period
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do not interpolate to v(0)= x and v′(0)= x′. (Note that the veri4cation share for the
zero coeCcients of the polynomials in every operational period will equal gxhx
′
.) Let
{(dˆj; dˆ′j)}j∈ be the interpolated dual shares of {vj( ); v′j( )}j∈ (which can be found
from the shares of t + 1 good servers). It is easy to see that
gxhx
′
= gv(0)hv
′(0)
=
∏
j∈
gvj(0)hv
′
j (0)
=
∏
j∈
gdˆjhdˆ
′
j :
We also have
∑
j∈
dˆj 
= x
and
∑
j∈
dˆ
′
j 
= x′:
But then
DL(h; g) =
(
∑
j∈ dˆj)− x
x′ −∑j∈ dˆ′j mod q:
Now say the adversary prevents a message m from being signed. It should be clear
that after at most t + 1 attempts, there will be a set  of t + 1 servers that participate
in signing m without any veri4cation failures. This implies that the signature obtained
must be incorrect. Let {Ei}i∈ be the check shares for the (single) additive shares
in this signing attempt. If
∏
i∈ Ei =y, then the signature must be correct, so we
may assume
∏
i∈ Ei 
=y. Let {(3i; 3′i)}i∈ be the extracted (or simulator generated, for
uncorrupted servers) dual-shares. It is easy to see that
gxhx
′
=
∏
i∈
Bi =
∏
i∈
Di =
∏
i∈
g3ih3
′
i :
We also have gx =y 
= ∏i∈ Ei = ∏i∈ g3i . But then
gxhx
′
= g
∑
i∈ 3ih
∑
i∈ 3
′
i ;
with x 
=∑i∈ 3i (and hence x′ 
=∑i∈ 3′i), and thus
DL (h; g) =
(
∑
i∈ 3i)− x
x′ −∑i∈ 3′i mod q:
Therefore, with probability 0− (tP(k) + 1)=q, DL(h; g) can be found.
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Security. Here we show that if the adversary can sign a new message, then it can
break the security of the (non-distributed) signature scheme w.r.t. the same attack [32].
Say an adversary can sign a new message in the DL-based proactive threshold pro-
tocol with non-negligible probability 0. We will show that we can sign a new message
in the underlying signature scheme with probability 0. Say the signature scheme has
parameters (p; q; g; y). Then we create the following simulator:
1. Initialization: The signature scheme gives parameters (p; q; g; y)
2. Simulate the dealer by generating h∈R Z∗p, x′ ∈R Zq, and producing a (t; l)-US-VSS
with polynomials (aˆ( ); aˆ′( )) on secrets 0; x′ (i.e., aˆ(0)= 0 and aˆ′(0)= x′).
3. Each (ordered) pair of servers performs the ZKSETUP-DL protocol, using g and h
as the generators, except that an uncorrupted veri4er interacting with a corrupted
prover uses the extractor to determine how to open the commitment for that prover.
4. Each server maintains a list G of server indices for servers that have not misbehaved
(i.e., they are considered good).
5. When a message m needs to be signed, the following DISTAPPLY protocol is run:
(a) A set ⊆G with ||= t + 1 is chosen in some public way.
(b) 2poly-to-2sum is performed using the simulator-generated (t; l)-US-VSS with
polynomials (aˆ( ); aˆ′( )), producing values (bˆj ; bˆ′j) for j∈, along with their
associated check shares. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are re-
moved from G and the protocol loops to Step 5a.
(c) An index of a faking server, say i, is picked at random from . 2sum-to-2sum is
performed using the simulator-generated values {(bˆj ; bˆ′j)}j∈ and their associated
check shares from the previous step, producing values (dˆj; dˆ′j) for j∈, along
with their associated check shares. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices
are removed from G and the protocol loops to Step 5a. If Si is compromised,
then the simulation rewinds to Step 5c, and is attempted again.
(d) For each j∈\{i}, Sj performs 2sum-to-1sum using the simulator-generated
values (dˆj; dˆ′j) and their associated check shares from the previous step. Si, how-
ever, produces Eˆi=ygdˆj and in each ZKPROOF-DL-REP actually proves knowl-
edge of how to open the commitment, instead of knowledge of the discrete log
of Eˆi. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are removed from G and
the protocol loops to Step 5a. If Si is compromised, then the simulation rewinds
to Step 5c, and is attempted again.
(e) The additive application step of the signature protocol is run, but with Si simu-
lated by using the signature on m obtained from the signature oracle. If there are
misbehaving servers, their indices are removed from G and the protocol loops
to Step 5a. If Si is compromised, then the simulation rewinds to Step 5c, and
is attempted again.
(f) So as not to bias the simulation with respect to the number of corruptions of the
adversary during the DISTAPPLY protocol, we randomly choose an index of one
of the remaining non-corrupted servers from , and if it is not i, the simulation
rewinds to Step 5c and is attempted again.
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6. For each update period, the following DISTUPDATE protocol is run:
(a) Each (ordered) pair of servers performs the ZKSETUP-DL protocol, except that,
as before, an uncorrupted veri4er interacting with a corrupted prover uses the
extractor to determine how to open the commitment for that prover.
(b) A set ⊆G with ||= t + 1 is chosen in some public way.
(c) 2poly-to-2sum is performed using the simulator-generated (t; l)-US-VSS with
polynomials (aˆ( ); aˆ′( )), producing values (bˆj ; bˆ′j) for j∈, along with their
associated check shares. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are re-
moved from G and the protocol loops to Step 6b.
(d) 2sum-to-2poly is performed using the simulator-generated values (bˆj ; bˆ′j) for
j∈ and their associated check shares. (Note that we use call these “b”
values instead of “d” values, as they are called in the 2sum-to-2poly proto-
col.) If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are removed from G and
the protocol loops to Step 6b.
Note that the probability of rewinding is exactly t=(t + 1), and thus the simulator
requires on average a factor of at most t+1 more time than the real protocol. Thus the
simulation is polynomial time. The simulation is perfect if all the extractors succeed.
Since the extractors have to be run at most ltU times (where U is the number of
update periods), and the probability of a single extractor failing is 1=q, the probability
of distinguishing a simulated view from a real view is ltU=q. Thus the simulation is
statistically indistinguishable from the real protocol.
If the adversary is able to then generate a new signature, then it is clear that we
would have an algorithm to break the signature scheme.
Proof of Theorem 2. We prove the robustness and security of the basic RSA-based
threshold protocol. Security is by direct reduction from RSA, while robustness is based
on Corollary 1. (We will call this the Corollary 1 assumption.) Recall that we assume
the adversary is stationary and adaptive. We will assume that the public key e is large
(5(k) bits). (For small e we can use a technique from Cramer et al. [11] to obtain
ZK proofs that allow us to prove similar results.)
Security. Here we reduce the security of RSA to the security of our basic RSA-based
threshold protocol. Say an adversary, after watching polynomially many messages be
signed in the basic RSA-based threshold protocol, can sign a new challenge message.
with non-negligible probability 0. Then we will give a polynomial-time algorithm to
break RSA with probability close to 0.
Say we are given an RSA key (N; e) and a challenge message m∗ to be signed.
We will run the adversary against a simulation of the protocol, and then present m∗
to be signed. We will show that the probability that an adversary can distinguish the
simulation from the real protocol is negligible, and thus the probability that it signs
m∗ is negligibly less than 0.
The simulator is as follows:
1. Initialization: The RSA parameters (N; e) are given. We may also assume that we
have a list of random message signature pairs {(m;m1=e)}.
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2. Simulate the dealer by computing the public value x∗ (using public values N; e; L,
as in the real protocol) generating g; h∈R Z∗N , x′ ∈R ZN 3 , and producing a INT-
(t; l)-US-VSS with polynomials (aˆ( ); aˆ′( )) on secrets 0; x′ (i.e., aˆ(0)= 0 and
aˆ′(0)= x′).
3. Each (ordered) pair of servers performs the ZKSETUP-RSA protocol, using g and
h as the generators, except that an uncorrupted veri4er interacting with a cor-
rupted prover uses the extractor to determine how to open the commitment for that
prover.
4. Each server maintains a list G of server indices for servers that have not misbehaved
(i.e., they are considered good).
5. When a message m needs to be signed, the following DISTAPPLY protocol is run:
(a) A set ⊆G with ||= t + 1 is chosen in some public way.
(b) 2poly-to-2sum is performed using the simulator-generated INT-(t; l)-US-VSS
with polynomials (aˆ( ); aˆ′( )), producing values (bˆj ; bˆ′j) for j∈, along with
their associated check shares. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are
removed from G and the protocol loops to Step 5a.
(c) An index of a faking server, say i, is picked at random from . 2sum-to-2sum is
performed using the simulator-generated values {(bˆj ; bˆ′j)}j∈ and their associated
check shares from the previous step, producing values (dˆj; dˆ′j) for j∈, along
with their associated check shares. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices
are removed from G and the protocol loops to Step 5a. If Si is compromised,
then the simulation rewinds to Step 5c, and is attempted again.
(d) For each j∈\{i}, Sj performs 2sum-to-1sum using the simulator-generated
values (dˆj; dˆ′j) and their associated check shares from the previous step. Si, how-
ever, produces Eˆi =m(1=e)−x
∗
mdˆj and in each ZKPROOF-IF-REP actually proves
knowledge of how to open the commitment, instead of knowledge of the dis-
crete log of Eˆi. If there are misbehaving servers, their indices are removed from
G and the protocol loops to Step 5a. If Si is compromised, then the simulation
rewinds to Step 5c, and is attempted again.
(e) So as not to bias the simulation with respect to the number of corruptions of
the adversary during the DISTAPPLY protocol, we randomly choose an index of
one of the remaining non-corrupted servers, and if it is not i, the simulation
rewinds to Step 5c and is attempted again.
Note that the probability of rewinding is exactly t=(t + 1), and thus the simulator
requires on average a factor of at most t + 1 more time than the protocol. Thus the
simulation is polynomial time. The probability of distinguishing the simulation from
the real protocol is at most the probability of distinguishing the simulated INT-(t; l)-
US-VSS from the real one, plus the probability of an extractor failing. All of this can
be bounded by (4t +2)=N + tl=e. Thus with probability negligibly less than 0, we can
generate a signature on m∗.
Robustness. Say P(k) is a polynomial bound on the number of messages m that the
protocol signs. Say an adversary prevents the signing of a message with non-negligible
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probability 0. We will show how to break the Corollary 1 assumption with probability
0− 2tP(k) + 1
e
:
Say an RSA public key was generated (N; e)←GE(1k) and we are given a uni-
formly chosen g; h∈Z∗N , as in Corollary 1. We use the simulator that is used to prove
security, except that g; h are taken from the RSA instance, and the extractor for the
ZKPROOF-IF-REP protocol is run whenever an uncorrupted server is playing the veri4er
and a corrupted server is playing the prover. We will show that if an adversary is able
to prevent a message from being signed, we can (except with negligible probability)
either 4nd ; ) such that g≡ h)mod N or 4nd u such that ue≡ gmodN .
If a server is not corrupted, the probability of a failed extraction using that server is
1=e. There will obviously be at least one uncorrupted server that runs the extractor with
every corrupted server, and thus the probability of any corrupted server not allowing a
successful extraction during the protocol is at most tP(k)=e. Say Si runs the extractor
successfully on Sj. If Si extracts a way to open the commitment Ci; j = g1i; j (1′i; j)
e, say
with (2i; j ; 2′i; j), then this will give
g1i;j (1′i;j)
e = g2i;j (2′i;j)
e;
and thus
g1i;j−2i;j = (2′i;j=1
′
i;j)
e:
Except with probability 1=e, gcd(1i; j − 2i; j ; e)= 1, so using the extended Euclidean
algorithm, one can compute ; ) such that e + 1= )(1i; j − 2i; j), and thus
g1=e =
(2′i;j=1
′
i;j)
)
g
:
Therefore, assuming the adversary has not distinguished the simulation from the real
protocol, with probability at most
tP(k) + 1
e
;
there was either an extraction that failed or an extraction that succeeded, but produced
a way to open Ci; j with an RSA–REP pair that did not allow one to compute the RSA
inverse of g. Recall that the probability the adversary can distinguish the simulation
from the real protocol is at most
4t + 2
N
+
tl
e
:
Now say the adversary prevents a message m from being signed. It should be clear
that after at most t + 1 attempts, there will be a set  of t + 1 servers that partic-
ipate in signing m without any veri4cation failures. This implies that the signature
obtained must be incorrect. Let {Ej}j∈ be the check shares for the (single) addi-
tive shares in this signing attempt for message m. (Recall that for the faking server
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Si, Ei =m(1=e)−x
∗
mdi modN .) Then mx
∗∏
j∈ Ej 
=m1=e. Let {(3j; 3′j; 6j)}j∈ be the ex-
tracted (or previously known to the simulator, for uncorrupted servers) dual shares,
along with the exponent on Dj. (For faking server Si, 3i =di, 3′i =d
′
i and 6i =1.) Let
6=
∏
j∈ 6j. It is easy to see that
(hx
′
)6 =
(∏
j∈
Bj
)6
=
(∏
j∈
Dj
)6
=
∏
j∈
(g3jh3
′
j )6=6j :
We also have
(m1=e)6 
=
(
mx
∗ ∏
j∈
Ej
)6
= (mx
∗
)6(m(1=e)−x
∗
m3i)6
∏
j∈\{i}
(m3j)6=6j :
But then
hx
′6 = g
∑
j∈(3j6=6j)h
∑
j∈(3
′
j6=6j);
with 0 
=∑j∈(3j6=6j) (and hence x′6 
=∑j∈(3′j6=6j)), and thus
g
∑
j∈ 3j6=6j = hx
′6−∑j∈ 3′j6=6j :
Thus, assuming the adversary can prevent a message from being signed, the proba-
bility of 4nding either ; ) such that g≡ h)modN or u such that ue≡ gmodN is at
least the non-negligible probability
0− tP(k) + 1 + tl
e
+
4t + 2
N
;
contradicting Corollary 1.
This concludes the proofs showing that the above protocols are robust and secure.
6. Conclusion
To summarize, we have provided protocols for distributed public-key systems that
are adaptively secure. Our techniques and protocols are eCcient and typically take
constant communication rounds when there are no faults (and a fault may cause a
constant delay).
Appendix A. ZK proofs
We use eCcient ZK proofs of knowledge (POKs) derived from Frankel et al. [24]
and Cramer et al. [11]. These are composed of combinations of 7-protocols [10] (i.e.,
Schnorr-type proofs [41]). For each ZK proof that we need, we will have a separate
proof protocol, but there will be a single setup protocol used for all ZK proofs. Say
A wishes to prove knowledge of X to B. Then the setup protocol will consist of B
making a commitment and proving that he can open it in a witness indistinguishable
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way [19], and the proof protocol will consist of A proving to B either the knowledge of
X or that A can open the commitment. (See [11] for details) This construction allows
the proof protocols to be run concurrently without any timing constraints, as long as
they are run after all the setup protocols have completed. (For more on the problems
encountered with concurrent ZK proofs see [36, 16, 17].)
The DL-based and RSA-based ZK-proof-setup protocols are exactly the 7-protocols
for commitments over q-one-way-group-homomorphisms (q-OWGH), given in [11].
Recall the q-OWGH for a DL-based system with parameters (p; q; g) is f(x)= gx
modp, and the q-OWGH for an RSA-based system with parameters (N; e) is f(x)= xe
modN (with q= e in this case).
Let KE denote the knowledge error of a POK.
Formally, we de4ne ZKSETUP-DLA;B(p; q; g; h) as a protocol in which A generates a
commitment C and engages B in a witness-hiding (WH) POK (KE=1=q) of 1; 1′ ∈Zq
where C ≡ g1h1′ mod p.
We de4ne ZKSETUP-RSAA;B(N; e; g) as a protocol in which A generates a commitment
C and engages B in a WH POK (KE=1=e) 10 of (1; 1′) (with 1∈Ze, 1′ ∈Z∗N ) where
C ≡ g1(1′)emodN .
We de4ne ZKPROOF-DLA;B(p; q; g; h; D) as a protocol in which A engages B in
a WH POK (KE=1=q) of either d∈Zq where D≡ gdmodp, or 2; 2′ ∈Zq where
CB;A≡ g2h2′ modp and CB;A is the commitment generated in ZKSETUP-DLB;A(p; q; g; h).
We de4ne ZKPROOF-DL-REPA;B(p; q; g; h; E; h′; D) as a protocol in which A engages
B in a WH POK (KE=1=q) of either d; d′ ∈Zq where D≡ gd(h′)d′ modp and E≡ gd
modp, or 2; 2′ ∈Zq where CB;A≡ g2h2′ modp and CB;A is the commitment generated
in ZKSETUP-DLB;A(p; q; g; h).
We de4ne 11 ZKPROOF-IF-REPA;B(N; e; g; m; E; h; D) as a protocol in which A, who
knows integers d∈ (−a; a] and d′ ∈ (−b; b] such that E≡mdmodN and D≡ gdhd′
modN , engages B in a WH POK (KE=1=e) of either 6∈Ze, 3∈ (−2ae(N + 1);
2ae(N +1)], and 3′ ∈ (−2be(N +1); 2be(N +1)] where D6≡ g3h3′ modN and E6≡ g3
modN , or (2; 2′) (with 2∈Ze, 2′ ∈Z∗N ) where CB;A≡ g2(2′)emodN and CB;A is the
commitment generated in ZKSETUP-RSAB;A(N; e; g). This protocol is honest-veri4er sta-
tistical zero-knowledge with a statistical diBerence between the distribution of views
produced by the simulator and in the real protocol bounded by 2=N .
A.1. Proof of representations
Here we give the main 7-protocol used in ZKPROOF-IF-REPA;B(N; e; g; m; E; h; D). 12
1. Initially, the parameters (N; e; g; m; E; h; D) are public, and A knows integers
d∈(−a; a] and d′∈(−b; b] such that E≡mdmodN and D≡ gdhd′ modN .
10 This implies e must be exponentially large in the security parameter k in order to obtain a sound proof.
However, if e is small (say e=3) we can use diBerent setup and proof protocols described in [11] to obtain
provably secure and robust RSA-based protocols.
11 IF stands for integer factorization.
12 Recall that this main protocol is combined with a 7-protocol proving knowledge of a commitment
generated in a setup protocol, using an OR construction.
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2. A generates r ∈R (−aeN; aeN ] and r′ ∈ (−beN; beN ], computes V =mr modN and
W=grhr
′
modN , and sends V;W to B.
3. B generates c∈R Ze and sends c to A.
4. A computes z= cd+ r and z′= cd′ + r′, and sends z; z′ to B.
5. B checks that mz ≡EcV modN and gzhz′ =DcW modN .
In all steps, A and B also check that the values received are in the appropriate ranges.
The above is a POK of 6∈Ze, 3∈ (−2ae(N +1); 2ae(N +1)], and 3′ ∈ (−2be(N +
1); 2be(N + 1)] in which m3≡E6modN and g3h3′=D6modN . The knowledge error
is 1=e, and the protocol is honest-veri4er statistical zero-knowledge, with a statistical
diBerence between views produced by the simulator and those in the real protocol
bounded by 2=N .
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